In her outstanding new book The Devil Never Sleeps, former Department of Homeland Security senior official Juliette Kayyem emphasizes that government and private-sector leaders should no longer focus all their attention and resources on disaster prevention.
Instead, they must learn how to plan accordingly and use all available tools to minimize the negative consequences when disaster does arrive.
We should think about applying this concept to foreign policy. It’s a realm where we are so often caught flat-footed when calamity hits. That leaves us in a reactive mode, often behind the curve. Just think of the debacle of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. But let’s now turn to the Russia-Ukraine crisis and see how Kayyem’s methodology applies to what is becoming the Biden administration’s most serious crisis.
Fortunately, our intelligence community has done a fine job to date in providing policymakers with an all-source picture of the Russian military order of battle. There’s nary a tank or artillery piece that we are not laser-focused on, with an unprecedented modern age intelligence “soak” in Europe that leaves no stone unturned. But remember, an accurate and robust intelligence picture is not predictive — nor is it designed to be. We can’t get in Russian President Vladimir Putin’s head in terms of his cost-benefit calculation on launching an invasion that most outsiders would see as wildly counterproductive for Russia. Of course, Putin may still find such a venture appealing due to his desire to turn back the clock and regain old territory of the Soviet Union.
We must emphasize the diplomatic track, hoping that Putin can see the light (albeit unlikely) and stand down on his hyperaggressive stance toward our Ukrainian partners. But painting that intelligence picture and hoping diplomacy works is simply not enough. As Kayyem notes, the “devil” will always strike in some fashion.
In this case, the devil is the Russia that we so often observe acting as a rogue state.
Whether interfering in another countries’ elections, engaging in war crimes by bombing hospitals in Syria, killing dissidents at home and abroad, or engaging in debilitating cyberattacks, Russia is a state that does not abide by international norms and conventions.
In turn, our baseline planning should assume that Russia will do something in Ukraine. The questions are: What will that something be? And how bad will said something ultimately be for Ukraine, and perhaps even for the stability of Europe?
Will Russia conduct further hybrid warfare activities, such as cyberattacks? Will it pursue more traditional “active measure” campaigns to destabilize the Ukrainian government? Or will it undertake a full-scale land invasion, using its 130,000 plus forces surrounding Ukraine? That would mean unleashing a potentially calamitous attack that would kill thousands on both sides. Or perhaps Russia will pursue a combination of these options.
I am encouraged by press reports that suggest that the United States has moved to Kayyem’s “right of boom” mentality. The place where we plan for the worst, assuming a question of “when” the Russian invading army crosses the Ukrainian border, not “if.” But what to do?
Well, our response should include robust plans for classic covert action (via the intelligence community) as well irregular warfare (via U.S. special operations forces), under separate authorities. In my view, the U.S. government is far better at assisting insurgencies than in running counterinsurgency operations, so this is a plus. Think of the U.S. assistance to the mujahedeen in Afghanistan in the 1980s as the model. I also believe there would be bipartisan congressional support for covert action and irregular warfare.
Could it be done?
Yes. Given U.S. government interactions with the Ukrainian national security establishment, I would expect that both the infrastructure and the experience of our personnel would make a strong difference in countering a Russian invasion.
In thinking about the world, it never is enjoyable to plan for worst-case scenarios. Yet we must do so. Let us hope that we do not have to turn loose our harder-edged capabilities on an invading Russian army. Again, however, the “devil” never takes a knee and quits.
Neither should we.
Marc Polymeropoulos is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. A former CIA senior operations officer, he retired in 2019 after a 26-year career serving in the Near East and South Asia. His book Clarity in Crisis: Leadership Lessons from the CIA was published in June 2021 by Harper Collins.
