Taiwan has a big problem.
Xi Jinping is increasingly concerned about his own leadership credibility and that of the Chinese Communist Party. Having carefully presented himself as the figure of CCP destiny in the 21st century, Xi cannot easily tolerate challenges to his rule.
Few challenges carry as much ideological weight as that of a flourishing, democratic Taiwan. Hawkish elements around Xi are pushing him to take action against that democracy sooner rather than later. The People’s Liberation Army’s preparation for such a venture is advancing at a rapid pace. The passage of time, the communists fear, will make any invasion of Taiwan harder the longer they wait to carry it out.
That’s just the start of Taiwan’s problems.
While President Tsai Ing-wen’s government has taken major steps to strengthen Taiwan’s military readiness, far more must be done. Taiwan’s defense spending and related measures of readiness remain totally inadequate for managing China’s existential threat.
As an extension, the U.S. means of deterring any PLA attack are also exaggerated. The U.S. Navy’s continued fixation on aircraft carriers as the centerpiece of its fleets is a testament to its enduring denial of reality. With each passing year, those aircraft carriers will take on greater risk if they attempt to operate close to Taiwan. In the event of war, the aircraft carriers will need to operate close to Taiwan because the grossly overrated F-35 fighter jets lack range. The Navy claims to Congress that it can preserve its aircraft carriers’ protective envelope with new technologies such as sensor bluffing systems and space-based interference of Chinese targeting satellites. But that’s far easier said than done when the PLA is deploying ever-more-sophisticated air and sea radar systems, multiple redundant targeting satellites, and anti-ship missiles against each and every aircraft carrier.
It gets worse.
In the context of the chaotic U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, the U.S. policy of “strategic ambiguity” toward Taiwan seems more like a policy of veiled hesitation than one of clever strategic nuance. President Joe Biden’s bumbling, hesitant support for Ukraine hasn’t improved things. Taiwan should also bear note that Americans will be unlikely to risk their sons and daughters in a faraway war in which many Taiwanese themselves seem hesitant to fight. Carefully read, the polling data are concerning, not comforting, when it comes to how many Taiwanese would resist invasion.
This is not to say that Taiwan’s cause is hopeless.
Eighty-one miles at its shortest point, the Taiwan Strait is a large distance for the PLA’s troop transports to traverse. Taiwan’s development of a vast, dispersed, and redundant anti-ship and anti-air network would give it a chance of blunting any invasion. Biden and other U.S. allies should enable that network with far greater speed and scale. Doing so would strengthen Taiwan’s deterrence influence within the Central Military Commission in Beijing. After all, the only thing that can temper Xi’s desire for reunification-born glory is his fear of the PLA, and his 21st-century destiny, ending up as a coral reef.
Still, such a threat consideration does not yet exist. And the trend lines are not in Taiwan’s favor. If this democracy is to survive and earn U.S. support in defense of its righteous existence, it must rapidly and dramatically improve its readiness to fight and win. The United States can and should do more to help, but Taiwan must sound readiness general quarters.
