Ukraine continues to impose a very heavy cost on Russian military forces. Barring the use of unconventional weapons, Russia faces a nearly impossible task in securing authority over major Ukrainian population centers.
Russian losses are so heavy, they can no longer be concealed at home. Fearing popular concern over a “security operation” that looks far more like what it is — a major war — the Kremlin has been forced to broadcast medal ceremonies for wounded soldiers. State organs and media have also refocused narratives over war objectives to southeastern Ukraine, playing down the idea of removing Volodymyr Zelensky’s government from power. These are positive indications. Still, because of the nearly theological prism through which Putin views his war, he is highly unlikely to withdraw his forces to Russia, Crimea, and the Donbas unless coerced to do so. The key for the West, then, is to help Ukraine force that withdrawal.
That means helping Ukraine fight more aggressively in what is known as the “deep battlespace” — the area behind the Russian front and the immediate front supporting lines of action. It includes Russian hubs for logistics trains and command groups supporting the main offensive effort. Considering that Russian logistics have been woeful already, Ukraine’s ability to exert additional pressure in the deep battlespace would produce an outsize effect on Russia’s combat potential.
After all, troops, trucks, and tanks need food, fuel, and ammunition. Seriously wounded troops also need means of evacuation to the rear. If Russian forces at the front suffer greater loss of logistics support, or if command groups are forced further to the rear, many more units risk losing even basic combat effectiveness.
We’re already seeing the impact of Ukrainian special forces in this regard, particularly to the east and northwest of Kyiv. As relatively small but highly mobile and well-equipped Ukrainian units push further against Russian lines, Russian forces are being forced into a defensive rolling retreat. One line of retreat threatens Russian flanks, forcing their reinforcement and the dilution of overall offensive potential.
This is the way to force Putin to choose between political compromise and the annihilation of his forces on a scale so great that a Kremlin palace coup could result.
So, what does Ukraine need to make this happen?
Longer range, heavier armed drones would be of particular value. Turkish-made TB2 drones have already played a critical role in Ukraine’s defense. But the supply of even a few U.S. MQ-1 or MQ-9 drones would provide greater value to Ukraine, even if these drones were supplied on the condition that they remain unarmed. Their relative stealth and persistent potential (they can stay airborne for many hours) allows for optimal intelligence and targeting of high-value enemy forces. In turn, the drones allow for the attenuated imposition of fear. Whether you’re a Russian general, colonel, or private, if you’re already exhausted, underfed, underequipped, and discouraged by your lack of progress, the constant threat of drone-derived destruction isn’t good for morale. Deployed on a greater scale, drones may foster the mass surrender or desertion of military units upon which Russia’s credible offensive or defensive potential now rests.
Even if the Biden administration is reluctant to provide larger drones, it should supply a far greater number of smaller tactical drones such as those of the Switchblade series that are now being delivered. Scale matters. Longer-range artillery such as the M270 multiple-launch rocket system would also greatly bolster Ukraine’s offensive power. This equipment is old, so its capture by Russia would not risk U.S. technical secrets. The U.S., Britain, and Israel could also make a major difference to front-line Ukrainian units by providing them with a range of deployable cyberwarfare equipment, which Ukraine could use to disrupt Russian access to and use of the electromagnetic spectrum. Again, even older equipment would help at the margin, denying Russian forces their means of communication and targeting.
The top line: Applied alongside U.S. deterrent steps to prevent Putin’s escalation with weapons of mass destruction or cyberwarfare, these tools would help Ukraine make the costs of continued war nearly impossible for Putin to bear.
